I recently gave an interview to the Fondation Jean-Jaurès — the French think tank linked to the Socialist Party (PS) — about the role of the state in economic change.
The interview was conducted by Renaud Large. In our conversation, we discussed the resurgence of industrial policy, the Chinese development model, the financialization of the US economy, developmental states, how Europe should respond to China’s rise, and the future of neoliberalism.
You can read the full interview below. On the Fondation Jean-Jaurès website, you can find the interview in both French and English. The interview is close to a verbatim transcript of our conversation, so it hasn’t been heavily edited.
Renaud Large: What can you tell us about the current resurgence of industrial policies? Does it mark the return of the state to the economy?
Jostein Hauge: It is clear: industrial policy is experiencing a renaissance. It has become respectable again. In the 1980s, the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the neoliberal movement was sweeping across the planet, it had a highly controversial reputation—which was logical, since it entails state intervention in markets. When it was tolerated, it had to be justified by clearly demonstrated market failures.
An anecdote my former PhD supervisor, the economist Ha-Joon Chang, who has written extensively on the subject, told me recently captures this well: in the 1980s, he said, writing a dissertation on industrial policy was like trying to prove that Elvis was still alive. People would ask him: ‘Why are you doing this ? It is absurd.’ That sums up the disrepute surrounding industrial policy at the time.
Today, it is returning, both in theory and in practice, and I see several reasons for this. The first is the 2008 financial crisis: it became more acceptable to challenge economic orthodoxy—neoliberal orthodoxy in particular—and the idea of a more active state gained ground, because the failings of the free market became so evident during the crisis.
The second is climate change. The state is once again becoming central to addressing it: transforming economic structures for the green transition almost always requires a strong state. But climate is not the only issue at stake: green industrial policy also enables countries to build competitive capabilities in the industries of the future. The aim is not only to save the planet, but also to be the ones manufacturing electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels.
The main reason, in my view, remains geopolitical. China’s rise carries enormous weight, especially for rich countries. We saw this first in the United States, and we now see it in Europe: the return of industrial policy is, to a large extent, a response to China’s emergence and to the sudden realization that competitiveness must be restored, otherwise essential industrial capabilities may be lost. It is also about securing a degree of strategic autonomy, supply-chain resilience, and so on.
And then, geopolitically, there is the collapse of the rules-based international order. For a long time there was a liberal international order built around shared rules. It was asymmetrical and benefited some countries more than others, but it existed, with the ambition of organizing international cooperation around common trade rules. One can of course criticize the way it actually worked, and the international solidarity it was supposed to embody remains open to question. But it has indeed collapsed, and that creates space for industrial policy to return. In a sense, we are living more under the law of the jungle.
That, in short, is why I believe industrial policy—and, to some extent, economic nationalism—occupies a more important place today.
Renaud Large: In this new landscape, how should the Chinese model be defined? There is much talk of ‘state capitalism’, a term that the Chinese Communist Party itself rejects. The Wall Street Journal, meanwhile, has described Donald Trump’s new industrial policy as state capitalism. So is state capitalism the right framework for understanding the international economy? Is the model becoming a kind of new paradigm, or are we instead witnessing the emergence of a common foundation expressed differently in the United States, China and Europe?
Jostein Hauge: Let me first discuss state capitalism in general before turning to China. As I understand it, the model refers to greater state intervention in the economy, particularly through public ownership and through the rise of sovereign wealth funds, in the Arabian Peninsula for example. The literature on state capitalism has focused heavily on developing countries, China foremost among them, but we now observe the same dynamic in rich countries. Broadly speaking, I think state capitalism can be defined as a mixed economy in which the state plays an expanded role, particularly as an owner.
In China’s case specifically, I think this model is relevant; it is not a bad analytical framework, because China remains, in many respects, a capitalist economy: labour is commodified, private companies are exposed to competition and operate in profit-seeking markets. At the same time, however, the hand of the state is heavy, particularly through state-owned enterprises. State capitalism therefore fits the Chinese reality quite well.
If many people in China reject this label—as I have often found in my discussions there—it is because it obscures how Chinese leaders actually think. The ruling party is called the Chinese Communist Party: that is not accidental. It emerged from a revolutionary movement that developed over several decades. It has around 100 million members, and a surprisingly large number of them have read Lenin, Mao and Marx in depth. There is nothing comparable in Norway, my own country, which could nevertheless also be described as state capitalist. It is essential to understand where this movement comes from, because that sheds light on how Beijing conceives the relationship between the state and the market.
As I understand it, the ultimate objective remains to reach a more advanced, theoretical form of socialism. Whether that will ever happen is another question, and I doubt it. But China has put in place arrangements that are not found in other state-capitalist economies: private capital always remains subordinate to the state; capital controls are strict; land is collectively owned; the financial system is entirely under state control; and private financial capital in China has, in reality, no power. State-directed investments also often follow a logic unrelated to profit. The consumer-goods sector, yes, can be described as capitalist. Elsewhere, the role of the state is much stronger, underpinned by this idea inherited from Lenin and Marx: to unleash the productive forces in order to meet the population’s material needs. This can be seen in the scale of infrastructure investment.
So, in my view, the Chinese model looks like a socialist market economy, more than simple state capitalism.
Renaud Large: Could you clarify what a socialist market economy is? How would you define it?
Jostein Hauge: It is a matter of combining elements of socialism with a capitalist market economy. When I speak of socialism, several elements matter, beginning with the question of who owns the means of production. In China, the public owns them through the state.Then there is the specifically capitalist dynamic of the market, particularly visible in the consumer-goods sector, where private companies thrive in most industries: BYD in automobiles, Huawei in electronics. These are private companies operating in private markets. And there is, of course, the commodification of labour. Marx believed that this would disappear under communism: China therefore certainly cannot be described as communist. Within the theoretical framework of socialist thinkers, the commodification of labour is itself a feature of capitalism.
That is the basic idea: a socialist model that incorporates elements of a capitalist market economy. I would also like to emphasize something that one quickly notices in China: the weight of Leninism. Lenin theorized the idea of a vanguard party guiding the proletariat, and that is precisely how the bureaucratic elite and the country’s leadership are structured. This is another essential element for understanding China’s political economy.
Renaud Large: Within this model, is there still a place for civil society? Is there a space between the state and the market for a third sector?
Jostein Hauge: If we are talking about employees themselves owning their company, as in cooperatives, I would say that this idea is more closely connected to socialist thought than to state capitalism. In theory, it seems entirely compatible with a socialist market economy.
But in practice, does it really exist ? If we take China, probably the most fully developed example of a socialist market economy today, the answer is: not really, or only to a very limited extent. There has been growth in worker ownership in certain companies, and a policy encouraging an increasing number of companies to establish Party cells within their organizations. More broadly, however, the idea of socialism as understood in Europe—which is not limited to cooperatives but also encompasses workers’ rights—sits uneasily with what is happening in China, in the eyes of many left-wing activists.
Two points deserve emphasis. First, how does an underdeveloped country develop within the global capitalist system? China understood very early that it had to accept trade-offs in order to attract the foreign capital needed for its development—capital that typically demands low wages and the subordination of labour. We therefore did not see a clearly socialist model in China, either in terms of ownership or labour rights. From a socialist perspective, that is regrettable, and I say so openly. But there has been a spectacular increase in real wages over several decades and an improvement in labour rights, even though they remain far below European standards. I believe the Chinese model must be placed in the context of development pursued from the periphery of the global capitalist system. The question of ownership and workers’ rights within a socialist market economy therefore remains genuinely complex, and I hope progress will continue.
Renaud Large: Turning to current American economic policy, the state as shareholder appears to be returning. The US government could acquire a stake in OpenAI to create a kind of public sovereign wealth fund intended to share the value created, as Norway does with oil. How would you describe the current phase of the American economic model?
Jostein Hauge: In my view, it would be a good thing if the state could capture part of the revenues generated by these companies. One could also argue that, to some extent, these revenues should return to the public. But today I would describe the American economic model as deeply financialized. By financialization, I mean a growing share of the economy being directed, for purely profit-seeking purposes, by large financial corporations. For many years, it has become very difficult to undertake long-term productive investment in the United States. Look at gross fixed capital formation—an indicator of productive investment—and compare the United States and China using World Bank data: the gap is striking. Why is the United States unable to build a simple railway line on either of its coasts? Why is it so difficult to sustain a long-term vision for industrial policy? The answer lies partly in the political system and in the fact that candidates are so closely tied to lobby groups. But it also lies in this logic: as soon as a profit is made, companies buy back their own shares, investment is driven by shareholder value, and so on.
That does not mean there is no industrial policy or productive investment in the United States. There is, and there are even examples of state capitalism. But among Western capitalist economies, the United States remains the most financialized. By far. And yes, this model can generate a form of innovation—entrepreneurship, technology start-ups, an ability to move quickly. But it is not always very clear for whom innovation is taking place or where it is leading.
We can see this today in the race for artificial intelligence. The United States is at the technological frontier in certain sectors thanks to its capitalist model and to the ‘creative destruction’ described by Schumpeter; that is the very heart of the model. But who ultimately benefits? In China, the answer is much clearer: it can be seen in smart factories, investment in drones, the faster development of autonomous driving and smart cities. The question of how to translate technology into public benefit is addressed much more immediately there.
Renaud Large: The developmental state in Asia—Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and others—combined an interventionist state, industrial policies and capital markets. This enabled very rapid economic development. What can be said about this model?
Jostein Hauge: The developmental state has been caught in academic works of Alice Amsden, Chalmers Johnson, Ha-Joon Chang and Robert Wade. They carried out extensive fieldwork in these East Asian countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. And I think China, in a certain sense, follows the same trajectory.
What is striking is that these states made industrial policy and long-term planning central pillars of government action. It is also very interesting to see how they conceived political legitimacy. In the West, legitimacy is generally associated with the electoral process and the ballot box. In the developmental-state model, legitimacy is built through economic development: the state derives its legitimacy from its capacity to meet the material needs of its population. That is how Korea approached the issue, as did Singapore; and if you ask Chinese officials, they make the same argument: legitimacy comes from the ability to deliver material results.
This is a crucial point in a largely authoritarian state, another feature shared by East Asian developmental states. We saw it in Korea and Singapore, two countries that certainly held elections but also had a leader who remained in power for around thirty years. We see it very clearly in China as well. For this model to work, it is necessary, first, genuinely to deliver economic development and, second, to have genuinely competent officials. This is already fascinating to study in Japan, Korea and Singapore, but China is even more so, because it has neither electoral democracy nor freedom of the press, with extensive censorship and a regime that is, in many aspects, authoritarian. There are real limits here, and I want to say so clearly. There is also a debate within China itself about the extent of this censorship, and many people would like it to be far more limited.
But China has a highly structured meritocratic system. One need only look at how difficult it is to become a top political leader in China. Beyond an excellent academic record, one must have served as a civil servant for many years—often at provincial level—and proved oneself. I have the impression that public officials are viewed in China very differently from how they are viewed in our societies. In Europe, we do not regard our elected representatives or senior civil servants as the most intelligent or the most virtuous people ; on the contrary, we often see them as careerists, self-centred and sometimes morally questionable. In China, those at the top are expected to be the most virtuous and the most committed to the public interest, an expectation supposedly demonstrated by a long career in public service.
That, I believe, is how the developmental-state model works: if legitimacy rests on economic development, a meritocracy capable of producing that development is required. China has achieved this, I think, with certain reservations, of course.
Renaud Large: And what about Europe in this landscape? We are seeing developments in foreign-investment screening and industrial policy in Europe. What is your view of Europe’s future? Is a new model of political economy emerging on the continent?
Jostein Hauge: I do indeed see industrial policy being discussed more and more in Europe. In the United States, the debate has been underway for some time; but in Europe too, there is increasing talk of what is called ‘China Shock 2.0’ and the risk of erosion of the industrial base. I want to be clear: it is essential for Europe to adopt an industrial policy and a long-term productive-investment strategy. It would be good for no one if the real wages of the working class fell and insecurity worsened for a majority of the population.
That said, the challenges differ from one country to another. In Germany, there is now a form of alarmism about China, because Germany has the most to lose industrially. A Portuguese friend, thinking about the relationship between the EU and China—the Industrial Accelerator Act, tariffs and so on—once asked me why he should have to pay for overpriced German cars when Germany, after China joined the WTO, had quickly stopped buying Portuguese T-shirts and turned directly to China. There are therefore internal tensions within Europe itself, between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ economies with different interests. It is somewhat unfortunate to see how much Germany, and to some extent France, are leading this debate when they face far greater challenges from China than, say, Portugal, and a situation very different from Norway’s, where these days people talk only about Russia, not China.
The way forward for Europe, particularly in relation to China, is to acknowledge that China has moved ahead in certain sectors and to build joint-ventures involving genuine technology transfer, just as China once imposed technology transfer through joint-ventures and local-production requirements. It would be unwise simply to rely on completely free trade with China. I therefore support a Europe that pursues industrial policy. But some self-examination is also needed: focusing the debate solely on an undervalued Chinese exchange rate or ‘unfair’ subsidies is, to a large extent, a double standard. It would be better to move forward on investment agreements and, above all, to listen to industrial companies themselves—to ask German car manufacturers what they actually want and what they consider reasonable.
Renaud Large: China has a huge bureaucratic apparatus for steering its industrial policy. Europe also has one, although it is far less imposing. How does this bureaucratic instrument concretely shape industrial policy in Europe and China? What are its levers? What is its real role?
Jostein Hauge: China has certain advantages: it does not have to contend with an independent central bank, for example, and can mobilize investment more easily through the institutions it has built. An OECD report catalogues industrial subsidies around the world and shows that in China a much larger share of these subsidies takes the form of below-market interest rates. Such an arrangement works only if rates are kept artificially low, which also entails constraining household returns on savings. Chinese industrial policy rests on genuine trade-offs: household consumption sacrificed over time and an undervalued exchange rate that imposes a cost on the domestic economy. I doubt that Europe, or European citizens, would accept sacrifices on that scale in order to mobilize investment at the same level.
That does not mean we lack instruments. Europe has a considerable capacity to mobilize credit; compare it, for example, with Ethiopia, which is trying to compete with China, or with Indonesia. Europe is in a much better position and also possesses genuine technological capabilities: it is not starting from zero. Germany has some of the most advanced manufacturing industries in the world; comparable strengths can be found in northern Italy and, to some extent, in certain regions of France. Continental Europe therefore does not, I think, need to reinvent the wheel. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is in a more difficult position : its deindustrialization has been under way for much longer, and it is now difficult to rebuild internationally competitive industries there because the economy has become so dependent on finance and consulting, concentrated in London. The challenges therefore differ, but I believe the capabilities and industries are clearly present in continental Europe.
Renaud Large: How do you analyse the current rise of sovereign wealth funds discussed by Ilias Alami and Adam Dixon? Is it a sign of a shift in the global economic model?
Jostein Hauge: I think it is a clever way for a state to avoid dissipating its resources into private hands if it wants to reinvest them one day. That said, this does not automatically translate into productive investment.
Take my own country, Norway: we have the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, and I believe it has proved extremely useful—for example, in enabling us to spend a little more during recessions. We did so during the financial crisis, drawing a defined share of the fund each year through the state budget. It has been valuable for financing a welfare state and allocating more resources to redistribution. On the other hand, it has not enabled us to build an economy less dependent on oil; practically all our jobs today remain in the domestic-services sector.
The example of Singapore and its Temasek fund is also interesting. Temasek operates almost like venture capital for the industrial sector. It can perform that role perfectly well. More generally, I am broadly favourable to sovereign wealth funds.
Renaud Large: The end of the neoliberal era is proclaimed roughly every ten years, without ever really happening. How do you explain this? Does neoliberalism remain the true driving force today?
Jostein Hauge: It all depends on how neoliberalism is defined. I think it was Quinn Slobodian who said that, historically, neoliberalism has primarily been a means for elites favourable to the free market—economic elites in particular—to find new levers for retaining power. If neoliberalism is understood as an extension of oligarchy, or of the enrichment of the rich, because free-market capitalism has indeed been a mechanism for enriching the wealthiest, then it is still very much alive; it is certainly not dead. But it has changed form. A large part of the international liberal and globalist project was globalization, and there we are clearly seeing a turning point: the doctrine of free trade, globalization and internationalism has, in many respects, died out.
So would it be better to describe our era as one of plutocracy, oligarchy and rule by the very rich? Someone like Branko Milanović would say that this really is the end of neoliberalism, since even globalists have abandoned those universal economic principles—free trade, globalization, and so on. That is roughly where I stand as well: alive in some respects, dead in others.
At the global level, it seems crucial to ask to what extent the idea of international solidarity still exists. It is the idea of preserving equal opportunities for everyone, everywhere in the world, regardless of nationality, race or gender. And I have the feeling that today only one political current still genuinely believes in it: the international left. It has always been an intrinsic principle of the left.
And it is a principle that is finding it increasingly difficult to secure a place in mainstream political debate, because even liberals claimed to believe in it—at least for a time—but that is no longer the case. This space has been taken over by economic nationalism, which can be dressed up in the language of ‘strategic autonomy’ or embraced openly, as J. D. Vance does when he says he opposes China’s rise.
With regard to China in particular, it has become entirely normal to oppose the rise of another developing country, essentially because that rise is not taking place according to our own rules. It is disruptive, but the real grievance is that it is not happening on our terms. And that, in turn, fuels even more nationalism.
This is an issue that, I believe, must be addressed urgently, because we are living through a moment when a new world order could genuinely emerge. We are witnessing the fragmentation of the liberal international order, born after the war and at Bretton Woods, and founded on shared rules. This is precisely the moment to try to build a new one. The question of how, amid all these tensions, international solidarity can be strengthened will become absolutely central.

